URBAN COMBAT AND URBAN STABILITY OPERATIONS

US Army Infantry School
Fort Benning, Georgia

AGENDA

- ENVIRONMENT
- SUPPORTING DOCTRINE
- TRAINING & EQUIP
- LESSONS LEARNED

ny

THE THREAT SPECTRUM IN COE

The Infantryman May Face Any or All in the Near Future

Doctrine has to anticipate the next conflict

Complex Adaptive Armies

- Technically Advanced
- Smaller Size … Expensive
- Support System Dependent
- Information Based



Armor/Mech Based Armies

- Selective Modernization
- Large Size
- Hierarchical C^3I
- Industrial Based

Infantry Based Armies

- Fundamentally Non-modernized
- Large Dismounted Force
- Tactical Level Operations
- Agrarian Based

Non-Nation Forces

- Criminals & Terrorists
- Political, Ethnic, Religious, Social, Tribal, Clan Factions
- Aggrieved Economic Classes

MATURING URBAN OPERATIONS DOCTRINE

1979

"…Built-up areas are isolated and bypassed…"

FM 90-10 MOUT

2003

"…Army forces will likely be required to conduct operations in and around large urban areas…"

FM 3-06 Urban Operations

- **ASSESS**
  IPB and Risk
- **SHAPE**
  Set conditions (STABILIT
  Supporting efforts
  Media and Info Ops
- **DOMINATE Simultaneous**
  and Sequential operatio
- **TRANSITION Control to**
  Non-military agencies

Modern Urban Stability Operations

“The question isn’t how many of them can we kill…we can kill them all.

The question is how few will we have to kill while getting the rest to do what we want them to do.”

Battalion Commander in Mogadishu

URBAN TACTICAL CHALLENGES

- Noncontiguous Areas of Operation
- Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Th
- Integrating Fires with Maneuver
- Enemy Mixed with Noncombatants
- Integrating Lethal & Non-lethal Ef

- Minimizing Collateral Damage and Noncombatant Casualties
- Dealing with Media on the Battlef
- Transitioning From Stability or Su

Operations to Combat…and Back

FUNDAMENTALS

- Civil/Political Considerations
- Focused Information Operations
- Understand the Human Dimension
- Aggressive Reconnaissance
- Decisive Close Combat
- Attrition Approach (Yes? No?)
- Control the Essential
- Consider Collateral Damage Is
- Preserve Critical Infrastructure
- Separate Combatants/Non-Combatants
- Restore Essential Services
- Transition Control

See The Infrastructure

THE URBAN BATTLESPACE



- **AIRSPACE**
  - RAPID AIR AVENUES OFAPPROACH
  - OBSTACLES = POLES, WIRES, ETC
- **SUPERSURFACE**
  - ROOFTOP, NO COVER
- **INTRASURFACE**
  - GROUND TO TOP FLOOR
  - INTERIOR OF BUILDINGS
- **SURFACE**
  - GROUND, STREET, OR WATER LEVEL
- **SUBSURFACE**
  - UNDERWATER
  - SUBTERRANEAN

URBAN ZONES

- CITY CORE
- CORE PERIPHERY
- DISPERSED RESIDENTIAL AREA
- HIGH RISE AREA
- INDUSTRIAL/TRANSPORTATION AREA
- PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS
- SHANTYTOWNS

All units must train to contain urban areas to protect the main body—3ID A

SOME URBAN KEY TERRAIN

- SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES
- CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS SITES
- FINANCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS
- HOSPITALS & HEALTH SERVICES
- ELECTRICAL GENERATION
- POLICE AND FIRE AGENCIES
- CIVIL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
- WATER/SEWAGE TREATMENT AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS
- FOOD AND FUEL STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION
- COMMUNICATION AND BROADCAST SYSTEMS
- THIRD-PARTY EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES
- TRANSPORTATION TERMINALS, AIRPORTS, DOCKS

SEE THE HUMAN DIMENSION

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS

- **Structures: Location, functions,, capabilities, application and consequences.**

- **Organizations: Groups or institutions that influence the area of operations.**

- **Events: Template and analyze for political, economic, psychologica environmental, and lega implications.**

ENEMY TACTICS

- Use population to his advantage.
- Try to win the information war.
- Manipulate and control key facilities.
- Use all dimensions and spaces.
- Avoid U.S. long-range fires.
- Employ urban-oriented organizations.
- Focus attacks on service suppor
  unpr re soldier
- Use s, ambus

EFFECTS ON US FORCES

- **Large Number of Troops Required to Clear and Secure Objectives, Relieve Fatigued Clearing Teams, Control and Protect Civilians, Replace and Evacuate Casualties. CAN'T BE JUST COMBAT ARMS TROOPS!**

- **Small Unit Leaders Are Both Critical and Vulnerable**

- **Frustrated Restraint + Cultural & Societal Differences + Sudden Intense Combat = High Stress**

- **High Operational Tempo + Physica**

  Demands = High Stress

Eric Feferberg / AFP

TRAINING

URBAN OPERATIONS TRAINING STRATEGY

- **Update doctrine and collective training**
- **Individual-to-battalion training facilities at home station**
- **Brigade urban training facilities at the Training Centers**
- **Regional combined arms training facilities**
- **Training facilities for forward deployed forces**
- **Simulations to support unit, staff training, and leader development**
- **Distance learning programs that support**

ENDSTATE

A doctrinally sound, operationally supported, <u>Live</u>, <u>Virtual</u>, <u>Constructive</u> training environment

Multi-echelon and Multi-functional Strategy



Infantry . . . On Point

TARGETRY

- 3 Dimensional
- Re-configurable
- Combatant / Non-Combatant
- Shoot Back



BDE Level Homestation L-V-C Training

Joint National Training Capability

FTI

High Level Architecture



Brigade
OneSAF
JCATS

Battalion
OneSAF
JCATS

Company
CDRs Digital Workstation
OneSAF
CCTT

DMPRC

Individual - Platoo
SSE JFET
EST 2000
S-CATT

Point for the

LIVE
Constructive
Virtual


CACTF
OneTESS
Simulators Center
Ft. Benning
Ft. Bragg
Camp Lejeune

WEAPONS & EQUIPMEMT

Non-Lethal Capability Set (NLCS)

40mm Area/Point Rounds



Improved Non-ballistic Face/Body Shields

12GA Area/Point/ Distraction Rounds

Ballistic Face/Body Shields

XM84 Stun Grenade

Modular Crowd Control Munitions

Non-ballistic/Ballistic Knee/Shin Guards



66mm Smoke/CS/Multiple ball

Portable Bullhorn

Expandable Baton

Sting Ball Grenade



Midsize Riot Control Agent (RCA) Dispenser

Individual Equipment

Interceptor Body Armor

Hands-Free Sling

Advanced Combat Helmet

Knee and Elbow Pads

LESSONS LEARNED AND RE-LEARNED

Infantry . . . On Point for the Army

LEADER COMMENTS-AFGHANISTAN

Soldiers conducted tasks such as <u>apprehend and search a suspect</u>, <u>stop and search vehicles</u>, <u>conduct hasty field interrogations</u>, <u>interact with civilian populace</u>, and <u>conduct personnel searches</u>.

The unit found that the *methods taught for securing and searching an enemy prisoner of war were o* *for handling a civilian suspect* who was not combatant.

Every operation contained a component of Operations. *Restraint and patience paid la dividends, but units had to constantly adap modify their TTPs.*

***JSOAs and AOs often overlapped*…caused continuous C2 and tactical problems which increased coordination requirements on the ground. Train with Civil Affairs and SOF at home station.**

Most walls were baked mud, grass, and *ly* AARs from the 82nd and 101st thick, *exceptionally resistant* to weapons fire and explosives.

TACTICAL LESSONS (RE) LEARNED

- **URBAN OPERATIONS ARE AN *ENVIRONMENT*, NOT A MISSION—CIVILIANS ARE ALWAYS A PART OF IT.**

- **URBAN COMBAT IS A COMBINED ARMS FIGHT THAT IS MANPOWER INTENSIVE. IT <u>CAN BECOME</u> CASUALTY INTENSIVE.**

- **SHORT RANGE "GUNFIGHTS" AT LESS THAN 35m ARE NORMAL. THERE ARE FEW TARGETS BEYOND 200 METERS. IMMEDIATE AND ACCURATE RESPONSE FIRE IS IMPORTANT.**

TACTICAL LESSONS (RE) LEARNED

- INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF TRAINING, MOTIVATION, AND UNIT COHESIVENESS.
- LEADERS AND SOLDIERS MUST KNOW R.O.E. AND LAW OF LAND WARFARE.
- INFANTRYMEN MUST BE TRAINED IN ADVANCED DEMOLITION TASKS.
- CSS SOLDIERS MUST BE TRAINED IN INFANTRY TASKS

TACTICAL LESSONS (RE) LEARNED

- **COMMANDERS MUST PRACTICE TACTICAL PATIENCE. LET JUNIOR LEADERS DEVELOP THE SITUATION. THE BATTALION COMMANDER CANNOT CONTROL EVERYTHING. DON'T EVEN TRY.**

- **LEADERS MUST EXECUTE MEASURED RESPONSES.**

- **CLOSE QUARTERS COMBAT DRILLS ARE SOMETIMES PREFERRED OVER HIGH INTENSITY ROOM CLEARING DRILLS. SOLDIERS NEED TO KNOW BOTH.**

- **LEADERS MUST KNOW WHEN TO USE ONE OR THE OTHER.**

TACTICAL LESSONS (RE) LEARNED

- CONVOYS, CASUALTY EVACUATION, AND RESUPPLY SHOULD BE PLANNED LIKE A COMBAT OPERATIONS. THEY ARE INTEGRAL TO THE FIGHT.

- UNITS MUST KNOW NON-LETHAL CROWD CONTROL TECHNIQUES AND HAVE THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT AND MUNITIONS ON HAND.

- SNIPERS AND DESIGNATED MARKSMEN CAN BE USED EXTENSIVELY WITH GOOD RESULTS.

- SOLDIERS MUST BECOME “BOOBY-TRAP and IED AWARE”.

TACTICAL LESSONS (RE) LEARNED

- COMBAT LIFESAVERS ARE VITAL. THEY FREE MEDICS TO TREAT MORE SERIOUS CASUALTIES.
- TRAIN TO CONTROL SMALL UNITS BY VISUAL SIGNAL, SOP, AND DRILL. CSS UNITS LACK WEAPONS MOUNTS ON VEHICLES, COMMS CAPABILITY.
- CSS UNITS DID NOT GET ENOUGH COMBAT EMPHASIS IN PRE-WAR TRAINING. BEING CORRECTED!
- SHOTGUNS ARE AN USEFUL DOOR BREACHING TOOL AS WELL AS PERSONAL WEAPONS.

TACTICAL LESSONS (RE) LEARNED

- **ARMORED FORCES EXCELLENT FOR QUICK PENETRATIONS, INFANTRY NEEDED TO CLEAR AND HOLD, ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT.**

- **LEADER/SOLDIER FAMILIARITY WITH FRIENDLY VEHICLES (LIGHT vs ARMORED vs COALITION).**

- **ARMORED AND LIGHT UNITS WORKING TOGETHER MUST UNDERSTAND THE DIFFERENT TEMPOS INVOLVED.**

TACTICAL LESSONS (RE) LEARNED

- **THE MK-19 DISTINGUISHED ITSELF AS A KILLING SYSTEM. ITS ABILITY TO BOTH SUPPRESS AND DESTROY ENEMY POSITIONS WAS PHENOMENAL.**

- **THE WING MAN CONCEPT OF CAL .50 MACHINE GUN IN TANDEM WITH THE MK-19 QUICKLY OVERWHELMED ANY DISMOUNTED OR LIGHTLY ARMORED ENEMY FORCE.**

- **ARMED HELICOPTER SUPPORT VERY EFFECTIVE, ESPECIALLY FROM KIOWA WARRIOR.**

TACTICAL LESSONS (RE) LEARNED

- **DURING THE BRIGADE TRAIN UP, THE FOCUS OF UO TRAINING WAS ON THE INFANTRY UNITS, USING ARMOR PRIMARILY IN A FOLLOW AND SUPPORT ROLE.**

- **DURING MUCH OF THE URBAN FIGHTING, TANKS WERE THE PRIMARY ATTACK FORCES.**

- **THE DEFICIENCY IN URBAN WARFARE TRAINING FOR THE TANK CREWS WAS NOTICEABLE AND FORCED UNITS TO CREATE ON-THE-SPOT TTPS THEY SHOULD HAVE TRAINED ON EARLIER.**

TACTICAL LESSONS (RE) LEARNED

- **ALL LEADERS MUST BE ABLE TO CALL AND DIRECT AERIAL FIRE SUPPORT.**
- **MORTARS AND DS FA VERY EFFECTIVE. TF COMMANDERS LOVED 120mm MORTAR .**
- **PROX FUZE LIMITS COLLATERAL DAMAGE, BUT DPICM DUDS ARE VERY PROBLEMATIC.**
- **M919 25mm ROUND GIVES EXCELLENT PENETRATION. HIGH EXPLOSIVE ROUND VERY EFFECTIVE.**


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
18-19th story
6-7th story
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60°
60 meters
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6
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PL A


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Multi-Dimensional Combined Arms Problem



ANY
QUESTIONS?